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A Legal Perspective on the
Trials and Tribulations of AI:
How Artificial Intelligence,
the Internet of Things, Smart
Contracts, and Other
Technologies Will
Affect the Law
Iria Giuffrida, Fredric Lederer, and Nicolas Vermeys†††
Dedication and Appreciation
Paul Giannelli and I first met when we, along with Ed Imwinkelried
and Fran Gilligan, were colleagues on the faculty of what today is The
Judge Advocate General’s School and Legal Center. We then became
co-authors of Courtroom Criminal Evidence.1 As a teacher of Evidence
and Criminal Procedure at William & Mary, I followed Paul’s career
with admiration. One of our leading evidence scholars, Paul has
combined creative, scholarly thinking with pragmatic realism to become
our nation’s leading scientific evidence authority. He has always been
ready and able to engage with important scientific advances.
In this short article, we address some of the legal issues that may
flow from the combination of Artificial Intelligence, the Internet of
Things, Smart Contracts, and related technologies. In doing so, we
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1.

Edward J. Imwinkelried, Paul C. Giannelli, Francis A. Gilligan &
Fredric I. Lederer, Courtroom Criminal Evidence (4th ed. 2005).

747

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 3·2018
The Trials and Tribulations of AI

acknowledge Paul’s outstanding career and seek to follow his lead as
we explore the legal implications of our world-changing technology.
-Fred Lederer, Chancellor Professor of Law and Director,
Center for Legal and Court Technology
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Introduction
Imagine the amazement that a time traveler from the 1950s would
experience from a visit to the present. Our guest might well marvel at:
•

Instant access to what appears to be all the information
in the world accompanied by the virtual elimination of
personal privacy;

•

Personal worldwide communication via voice, text, and
images;

•

Decisions and recommendations made by computers
whether in the form of instantly implemented stock
trades, recommended medical diagnosis, or criminal case
bail release;
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•

Crypto-currencies such as Bitcoin implemented by
blockchain, a distributed and decentralized electronic
ledger held by all users that updates instantly;

•

Electronic commerce based in significant part on what
computers anticipate and persuade consumers to
purchase;

•

Manufacture by robots;

•

Semi-autonomous and, soon, fully autonomous selfdriving vehicles of all types.

And so much more . . .
As history has shown us, every technological advance is accompanied by legal questions.2 We believe that our modern high-technology
era will be faced by an unusual number of such questions growing out
of what we will undoubtedly term, “artificial intelligence” (“AI”), but
which in fact is the combination of advanced algorithms, important
pools of data, usually referred to as “big data,” and the many technologies that exploit these. Some questions are versions of traditional
issues, such as tort liability for semi-autonomous or autonomous automobile collisions. Others may be termed novel: when, if at all, might a
“computer” statement be hearsay or a “computer” be liable for tortious
injury—or even murder3—or might it be sued for breach of copyright
because the “computer” is considered a “person”? How will we define a
“smart contract;” what knowledge and skills will a responsible lawyer
need to know to avoid a successful malpractice suit?
With the assistance of our student colleagues at William & Mary
Law School’s Center for Legal and Court Technology, and faculty and
supporting staff of the University of Montreal’s Cyberjustice Laboratory, the three of us are engaged in trying to predict the nature of the
legal issues that exist, that will clearly grow out of, and those that
might stem from AI and related technologies. This Article is only an
introduction to that task. It aims to add to the already numerous publications and journal articles written on the topic of law4 and AI by
2.

See, e.g., Ethan Katsh, The
Transformation of Law (1989).

3.

See, e.g., Gabriel Hallevy, When Robots Kill: Artificial
Intelligence Under Criminal Law 38 (2013) (relating that in 1981 a
Japanese motorcycle employee was killed by a robot working next to him
after the robot’s algorithm determined that the employee was a threat to its
mission, and that pushing the employee into an adjacent machine would
remove the problem, which it did, as it killed the employee).

4.

See e.g., Ryan Calo et al., Robot Law (2016); Mireille Hildebrandt,
Smart Technologies and the End(s) of Law (2016); John Frank
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honing into what we believe to be the crux of the issue: AI-enabled
devices exist in a technological ecosystem. Therefore, we cannot simply
address the impact of a given technology without establishing how it
will interact with others, more importantly how data will be generated,
shared, used, and monitored by AI-enabled devices. The aim of this
Article is to contribute further to a basic and useful understanding of
the legal problems to be generated by that ecosystem, leaving to later
articles more detailed discussions of those problems and related ones
such as the critical and numerous privacy issues raised by these and
related technologies.
Of course, anticipating the future does not easily lend itself to
exhaustive prediction. What is absolutely sure is that the combination
of the technologies addressed in this Article will change the world
beyond anything most of us can anticipate and that the legal professions
are unprepared for the legal consequences.5
Initially, this Article will define the relevant terms, such as
“Artificial Intelligence,” which can mean very different things.
Emphasizing the impact of the combination of the related technologies,
the Article will then survey the legal risks that can stem from algorithms, arguably the heart of AI. Next, this Article will briefly address
Smart Contracts and some of their implications. Finally, this Article
will discuss the need to create an environment where AI can flourish
while co-existing with a society of rights.

Weaver, Robots Are People Too: How Siri, Google Car, and
Artificial Intelligence Will Force Us to Change Our Laws (2013);
Samir Chopra & Laurence F. White, A Legal Theory for
Autonomous Artificial Agents (2011). In fact, a quick Westlaw search
for the expression “artificial intelligence” brings up over 2,500 journal and
law review articles.
5.

This is not to say that governing bodies are ignoring the subject. Both federal
and state organizations, for example, are attempting to encourage and
regulate self-driving cars. See generally Autonomous Vehicles/Self-Driving
Vehicles Enacted Legislation, Nat’l Conference State Legislatures,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/autonomous-vehicles-selfdriving-vehicles-enacted-legislation.aspx [https://perma.cc/RJG5-436D] (last
visited Jan. 25, 2018) (“Since 2012, at least 41 states and D.C. have
considered legislation related to autonomous vehicles,” and twenty-one states
have enacted legislation). Advisory panels are being created to define
problems and solutions. See, e.g., Andrew Burt, Leave A.I. Alone, N.Y.
Times (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/04/opinion/leaveartificial-intelligence.html [https://perma.cc/44F8-FXQ6] (“[A] bipartisan
group of senators and representatives introduced the Future of A.I. Act, the
first federal bill solely focused on A.I. It would create an advisory committee
to make recommendations about A.I.”).

750

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 3·2018
The Trials and Tribulations of AI

I. Artificial Intelligence, the Internet of Things, and
Smart Contracts: What Does It All Mean?
One of the main issues that must be faced when addressing the legal
underpinnings of technological innovations is rooted in the vocabulary
used by those developing and marketing these tools. Information Technology (“IT”) professionals, like lawyers, have developed a somewhat
dense and opaque lexicon that is undeniably complex to master for the
uninitiated. That being said, unlike legal terms which are expected to
have a single definition unless otherwise stated in the statute, most
technological constructs benefit from shifting meanings depending on
the author.6 This adds to the confusion of those who try to predict how
the law should treat AI, for example, as authors cannot agree on what
AI represents conceptually. Therefore, to borrow the language from
Canadian author Hugh MacLennan, lawyers and IT specialists very
much represent “two solitudes” who speak different languages, yet often
using the same words.7
Given, however, that an Article like this one relies on a common
understanding of somewhat novel concepts in order to carve out a legal
framework, it is important to at least try and offer a general outline of
the main terms popping up in the media which will undoubtedly find
their way into the courtroom. Although the list of terms to choose from
is long and ever-growing as new concepts seem to emerge daily, this
Article will focus on the three interlinked, yet distinct, notions that
have titillated the legal community in the last few years: AI,8 the
Internet of Things,9 and Smart Contracts.10
A. What Is Artificial Intelligence?

According to common knowledge, the term “Artificial intelligence”
may first have been coined by John McCarthy, Marvin L. Minsky,
Nathaniel Rochester, and Claude E. Shannon,11 in a 1955 paper, A
6.

See Statistics Can., A Reality Check to Defining eCommerce, Gov’t Can.
(1999), http://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/CS88-0006-99-06E.
pdf [https://perma.cc/UCE8-6MNH] (“[A]s with any new concept, the
understandings of what the terminology means are as diverse as the
individuals involved. Hence it is often confused or misused.”).

7.

Hugh Maclennan, Two Solitudes (1945).

8.

See infra Part I.A.

9.

See infra Part I.B.

10.

See infra Part I.C.

11.

See, e.g., Gill Press, Artificial Intelligence (AI) Defined, Forbes (Aug. 27,
2017, 12:00 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/gilpress/2017/08/27/
artificial-intelligence-ai-defined/#45cc151f7661 [https://perma.cc/Z6NY-4U
C4; see also, Chris Smith et al., The History of Artificial Intelligence 5
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Proposal for the Dartmouth Summer Research Project on Artificial
Intelligence.12 The authors explained that:
An attempt will be made to find how to make machines
use language, form abstractions and concepts, solve kinds of
problems
now
reserved
for
humans,
and
improve
themselves. . . . For the present purpose the artificial
intelligence problem is taken to be that of making a machine
behave in ways that would be called intelligent if a human
were so behaving.13
Fast forward to 2018, and although AI is talked about in the media
almost every day, there is still no generally accepted definition of the
term. Individual definitions run the gamut from a super-intelligent,
humanoid, sapient, world-conquering robot to an app that suggests that
the weather justifies wearing a coat. According to the Merriam-Webster
dictionary, “Artificial Intelligence” can be defined as “[a] branch of
computer science dealing with the simulation of intelligent behavior in
computers,” or [t]he capability of a machine to imitate intelligent
human behavior.”14 This definition is at best misleading and functionally useless.15
Rather than taking this approach, some have defined AI by its
components.16 For example, while giving a lecture to the Council of
Bars and Law Societies of Europe, Andrew Arruda, co-founder of Ross
Intelligence,17 presented AI as a blanket term encompassing four types
(2006), https://courses.cs.washington.edu/courses/csep590/06au/projects/
history-ai.pdf [https://perma.cc/RKY3-CR53].
12.

The article was re-published in 2006. See John McCarthy et al., A Proposal
for the Dartmouth Summer Research Project on Artificial Intelligence:
August 31, 1955, AI Magazine, Winter 2006, at 12, 12.

13.

Id. at 2, 11.

14.

Artificial Intelligence, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/artificial%20intelligence
[https://perma.cc/3BXT-QKEL] (last visited Mar. 4, 2018).

15.

This Article later asserts that AI based on machine learning basically exists
when a computer, via its algorithms, can modify its implementing algorithms
in order to better carry out the goals set by its major algorithms. See infra
notes 19–22 and accompanying text.

16.

CCBE, Presentation ROSS Intelligence by Andrew Arruda, Youtube (Nov.
18, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hJk-dQnn4M8.

17.

See generally ROSS, rossintelligence.com [https://perma.cc/YQ87T6FS] (last visited Mar. 29, 2018); John Manes, ROSS Intelligence Lands
$8.7M Series A to Speed Up Legal Research with AI, TechCrunch,
https://techcrunch.com/2017/10/11/ross-intelligence-lands-8-7m-series-a-to
-speed-up-legal-research-with-ai/ [https://perma.cc/B2F4-XZSR] (last visited
Feb. 11, 2018).

752

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 3·2018
The Trials and Tribulations of AI

of technologies: machine learning, speech recognition, natural language
processing, and image recognition.18 Although the Authors of this
Article would agree that these four concepts fall within the boundaries
of AI, it could be argued that they do not actually represent distinct
technologies as speech recognition and natural language processing
could be seen as two sides of the same coin. Furthermore, both these
technologies—as well as image recognition—can, and often do, rely on
machine learning algorithms.
Of course, this begs the question: what are machine learning
algorithms?
Let us first address the simpler of the two terms. In its most basic
form, an algorithm is the set of software rules that a computer follows
and implements. Put slightly differently, an “algorithm” is a program
that evaluates data and executes given instructions. For example, in
today’s world, much of the day’s stock market trading is conducted by
highly complex algorithms rather than by people. The algorithm is the
key to AI.19 A computer’s ability to function sufficiently well to carry
out its programmed texts requires sufficiently adequate hardware.
However, what the computer does is the result of the algorithms running
in the computer’s hardware.
Machine learning can be summarized as the ability of a computer
to modify its programming to account for new data and to modify its
operations accordingly.20 It “uses computers to run predictive models
that learn from existing data to forecast future behaviors, outcomes,
and trends.”21 Machine learning therefore is dependent on data. The
more data it can access, the better it can “learn.” However, the quality
of said data, the way the data is inputted into the system, and how the
system is “trained” to analyze the data can have dire effects on the validity, accuracy, and usefulness of the information generated by the
algorithm. 22

18.

CCBE, supra note 16, at 2:00-2:19.

19.

A sufficiently well executed extraordinarily complex algorithm might well
pass the “Turing test”: can a remote human being distinguish a machine
from a person? Cf. ELIZA, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
ELIZA [https://perma.cc/7YLP-MM7V] (last visited Mar. 4, 2018).

20.

E.g., a computer monitoring a factory assembly line determines that
employees are more efficient in the afternoon in cooler temperatures than
usual and drops the line temperature to 67 degrees from 69 degrees.

21.

Jonathan Sanito et al., Deep Learning Explained, edX, https://www.
edx.org/course/deep-learning-explained-microsoft-dat236x-1 [https://perma.
cc/G94C-9EG5] (last visited Mar. 4, 2018)].

22.

See Pedro Domingos, A Few Useful Things to Know About Machine
Learning, Comm. of the ACM, Oct. 2012, at 78, 78.
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In short, an otherwise perfect algorithm can not only fail to accomplish its set goals but may prove affirmatively harmful. For example,
the algorithm used by Google to answer user questions erroneously
declared that former president Barack Obama, a Christian, was a
Muslim.23 In that case, the algorithm was not at fault. It simply gathered data from the Internet, “feeding” on websites that propagated false
information. Its data pool was polluted, and the algorithm could not
discern between “good” and “bad” data. Another example is that of the
Microsoft chatbot, “Tay,” which learned to interact with humans via
Twitter.24 Within twenty-four hours, the chatbot “became racist,” for
lack of a better word, because “Internet trolls”25 had bombarded it with
mostly offensive and erroneous data, i.e. inflammatory tweets, from
which the Chatbot had “learned.”26
Even when the data is accurate, the individual “training” the AI
could infuse his or her own biases into the system. This may have been
a factor in crime-predicting software that has led to the arrest of an unjustifiably high number of African Americans and other minorities,27 as
well as sentencing tools that predict higher rates of recidivism for these
same individuals.28
23.

Jack Nicas, Google Has Picked an Answer for You—Too Bad It’s Often
Wrong, Wall St. J. (Nov. 16, 2017, 10:58 AM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/googles-featured-answers-aim-to-distill-truthbut-often-get-it-wrong1510847867 [https://perma.cc/2PV2-HDA2].

24.

Daniel Victor, Microsoft Created a Twitter Bot to Learn from Users. It
Quickly Became a Racist Jerk., N.Y. Times (Mar. 24, 2016), https://
www.nytimes.com/2016/03/25/technology/microsoft-created-a-twitter-botto-learn-from-users-it-quickly-became-a-racist-jerk.html [https://perma.cc/
JF5A-VXCH].

25.

This is a slang term used to identify an Internet user who:
sows discord on the Internet by starting quarrels or upsetting people,
by posting inflammatory, extraneous, or off-topic messages in an
online community (such as a newsgroup, forum, chat room, or blog)
with the intent of provoking readers into an emotional response or
of otherwise disrupting normal, on-topic discussion, often for the
troll’s amusement.
See, for lack of a better source, Internet Troll, Wikipedia, https://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_troll (last visited Jan. 25, 2018) [https://
perma.cc/68V4-6A6P].

26.

Victor, supra note 24.

27.

Cathy O’Neil, Weapons of Math Destruction 85–87 (2017).

28.

Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, ProPublica (May 23, 2016), https:
//www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminalsentencing [https://perma.cc/45JM-QM5P]. If a software decision-making
assistance tool for judges erroneously predicts racial minority members are
more likely than others to violate pretrial release terms or to re-offend, then
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Accordingly, the effective accuracy of an algorithm is dependent on
both the programming and the data. This dictates a further, legallytroubling conclusion. If there are doubts about the results of an algorithm, one can at least theoretically inspect and analyze the programming that makes up the algorithm. Given the volume of data
available on the Internet, however, it may be impossible to adequately
determine and inspect the data used by the algorithm.
Machine learning should be envisioned as a spectrum that ranges
from relatively simple algorithms to complex self-teaching systems that
could eventually mirror the human brain in their complexity—if not
their structure. This later subset of machine learning is usually
presented as “deep learning,” i.e. “a sub-field of machine learning, where
models inspired by how our brain works are expressed mathematically,
and the parameters defining the mathematical models, which can be in
the order of few thousands to 100+ million, are learned automatically
from the data.”29 Deep learning relies on what is referred to as neural
networks, an interconnected group of nodes said to be modeled after
the human brain.
This overview leads to two somewhat obvious, yet essential,
observations. First, use of AI does not require or imply self-aware
technology. It does, however, encompass technology that can substantially change sub-goals when necessary to maximize accomplishment of
a larger goal, a possibility that permits unanticipated and potentially
deadly consequences.30 Second, although AI requires hardware, it should
not be understood as such—hence, why the term “robot,” although
technically accurate, is somewhat misleading because of how robots
have been depicted in science-fiction books and movies. AI should be
understood as software incorporated in or installed on hardware to
implement the designer’s goals. This is essential to understand because,
as is common knowledge, software can be hacked, pirated, or otherwise
corrupted. Third, and most importantly, the vocabulary associated with
AI can be somewhat misleading. Because of the use of terms like
“intelligence,” “learning,” “teaching,” etc., AI can sometimes be seen as
a form of sentient being, a belief reinforced by Hollywood blockbusters.
However, as stated by Justice Mahoney in the Canadian case, Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Mackintosh Computers Ltd.:31
that could be because of defects in the algorithm, defects in the underlying
data, or an accurate reflection of a racially biased criminal justice system.
29.

Sanito et al., supra note 21.

30.

And as Hamlet mused, “ay there’s the rub.” William Shakespeare,
Hamlet act 3, sc. 1; see also infra notes 48–49 (briefly discussing AI
behavior when reacting to an unexpected situation).

31.

[1988] 1 F.C. 673 (Can.).
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The principal difficulty which this case has given me arises
from the anthropomorphic character of virtually everything
that is thought or said or written about computers.
Words
like
“language”,
“memory”,
“understand”,
“instruction”, “read”, “write”, “command”, and many others
are in constant use. They are words which, in their primary
meaning, have reference to cognitive beings. Computers are
not cognitive. The metaphors and analogies which we use to
describe their functions remain just that.32

Although, as this Article addresses further on, there are those who
would grant AI legal personhood33—which might well be proven necessary in the future—this Article posits that Justice Mahoney’s wise
words remain valid when considering current AI algorithms. AI is not
simply R2-D2 or C-3P0, it also encompasses simple algorithms that
help you pick which movie to watch on Netflix or that protect your
mailbox from spam emails.
Therefore, to summarize, AI covers a gamut of technologies from
simple software to sentient robots, and everything in between, and
unavoidably includes both algorithms and data. This is why the current
buzz surrounding AI is somewhat inaccurately portrayed by many, as
it is not AI as a whole that has people talking, but rather advances in
machine learning and related technologies. At least initially, this may
simplify matters such as tort liability for injuries caused by AI.
B. What Is the Internet of Things?

The “Internet of Things” (“IoT”), or as Cisco’s Maciej Kranz calls
it, “The Internet-of-Everything,”34 describes the way in which so many
electronic devices communicate with each other, sharing data and sometimes even operations. More specifically, it refers to “the networking
capability that allows information to be sent to and received by objects
and devices, such as fixtures and kitchen appliances, using the
Internet.”35
Conceptually, the IoT is much easier to grasp for those of us who
are less technologically inclined than the more complex notion of AI. A
refrigerator automatically reordering milk when its sensors notice that
32.

Id. at 27.

33.

See Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, 70
N.C. L. Rev. 1231 (1992); see also F. Patrick Hubbard, “Do Androids
Dream?”: Personhood and Intelligent Artifacts, 83 Temp. L. Rev. 405
(2011).

34.

See Maciej Kranz, Building the Internet of Things 12, 15 (2017).

35.

Internet of Things, Merriam Webster Online Dictionary, https://
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Internet%20of%20Things [https://
perma.cc/9L3R-K27H] (last visited Feb. 9, 2018).
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you are about to run out is simpler to explain than how the algorithms
that allows it to do so were programmed.
Yet, the IoT poses its own terminological challenges, and, like AI,
is lacking in a universally accepted definition. At the core of the confusion is the link, or lack thereof, between the IoT and other similar
concepts such as machine-to-machine communications, or cyber-physical systems. For example, according to the National Science Foundation, “Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are engineered systems that are
built from, and depend upon, the seamless integration of computational
algorithms and physical components.”36 Using this definition, one could
suggest that all IoT devices are actually cyber-physical systems, while
cyber-physical systems are not necessarily IoT devices as they are not
all connected to the Internet. However, the International Organization
for Standardization (“ISO”) offers a different analysis:
It became clear right from the outset that the notions of IoT,
Cyber Physical Systems (CPS), and Machine to Machine
Communications (M2M) were quite similar. This conclusion was
reached based on observing M2M standardization activities . . . as
well as academic research in the CPS area. Therefore, [the
working group] expanded the scope of its search and identified
about two dozen definitions for IoT, M2M, and CPS that were
regarded as better than many others that were found. More
definitions were found and added to the list of reasonable
definitions later. Over the past two years, other notions such as
the Industrial Internet, Internet of Everything, and Industrial IoT
have been proposed [but were regarded] as too similar to the IoT.
Hence, [the working group] decided to define the IoT in such a
way that it would include the characteristics of all these similar
notions. It is unlikely that in the long run more than one of these
terms would survive.37

So how does ISO define the IoT? Although the organization admits
that “there is no way of capturing all the complexities of the IoT in a
2 to 3 line definition,”38 it still proposed one for the sake of discussion.
According to the ISO, the IoT is “[a]n infrastructure of interconnected
objects, people, systems and information resources together with intel36.

Cyber-physical Systems, Nat’l Sci. Found., https://www.nsf.gov/funding/
pgm_summ.jsp?pims_id=503286 [https://perma.cc/4V9B-UBPW] (last
visited Feb. 9, 2018).

37.

ISO/IECJTC1, Internet of Things (IoT) Preliminary Report 2014,
at 2, https://www.iso.org/files/live/sites/isoorg/files/developing_standards/
docs/en/internet_of_things_report-jtc1.pdf [https://perma.cc/AH9Q-SP7B]
(last visited Mar. 29, 2018).

38.

Id. at 3.
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ligent services to allow them to process information of the physical and
the virtual world and react.”39
Arguments could obviously be made for or against this or other
definitions of the IoT. However, for the purpose of this Article, the
interesting aspect of the ISO definition is that it emphasizes the undeniable link between AI and the IoT, or rather the fact that the IoT
relies on AI algorithms. And, to once again paraphrase Shakespeare:
“there’s the rub,” for AI data likely comes to the algorithm via the
Internet potentially originating from countless different sources.
Consider, for example, that a computer responsible for stock market
trades almost certainly is monitoring and responding to Internet-derived data describing financial transactions from all over the world.
Given the immense number of devices and the amount of data available
on the Internet, a computer that uses Internet-derived data can yield
unpredictable results. As we will see, one of the most difficult issues
inherent in AI is how to assure that the data used by a computer is in
fact accurate. Not only is information originating on the Internet, such
as on social media, often inaccurate, but the Internet also contains
intentionally false data often spread extensively by “bots” and similar
technologies that run automated tasks—such as spreading inflammatory content—at a higher rate than humanly possible.40
From a legal standpoint, this issue is rarely addressed when discussing the IoT. Most authors usually center their analysis on the legal
implications of connected devices collecting and sharing personal data
about their users.41 Although the Authors fully recognize the need to
study the effects of the IoT and AI more generally on privacy, the topic
39.

Id. at 4.

40.

Consider the allegations that the United States and other national elections
have been intentionally influenced by false data such as computer produced
or bot social media communications. See e.g., Scott Shane, The Fake
Americans Russia Created to Influence the Election, N.Y. Times (Sept. 7,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/07/us/politics/russia-facebooktwitter-election.html [https://perma.cc/KE6X-LSYS]; Kai Kupferschmidt,
Social Media ‘Bots’ Tried to Influence the U.S. Election. Germany May Be
Next, Science (September 13, 2017, 3:45 PM), http://www.sciencemag.
org/news/2017/09/social-media-bots-tried-influence-us-election-germany-may
-be-next [https://perma.cc/98W7-8EFS].
If one is familiar with the programming of a given algorithm, it is even
possible to intentionally create data that the algorithm will interpret as
something entirely different. See, e.g., Mark Harris, Researchers Find a
Malicious Way to Meddle with Autonomous Cars, Car & Driver (Aug. 4,
2017, 11:06 AM), https://blog.caranddriver.com/researchers-find-a-maliciousway-to-meddle-with-autonomous-cars/ [https://perma.cc/527D-F3A4]
(among other matters, directional street signs could be altered in such a way
as to fool the algorithm into interpreting them as speed signs).

41.

See, e.g., Rolf H. Weber, Internet of Things—New Security and Privacy
Challenges, 26 Computer L. & Security Rev. 23, 24 (2010).
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remains outside of the scope of this Article which focuses on the impacts
of the quality and availability of data, rather than the legality of collecting, processing, and retaining data.
C. What Are Smart Contracts?

A “Smart Contract” can be defined as a legal agreement that
contains or exists in the form of an algorithm. Unlike a traditional
contract, which only lays out the terms of agreement for subsequent
execution, a smart contract autonomously executes some or all of the
terms of the agreement. A smart contract can be extraordinarily
sophisticated and complicated, executing via the Internet, for example,
transactions at different costs and dates depending upon data such as
currency exchange rates, stock market prices, costs of given raw materials, and anticipated weather conditions.
Notwithstanding their names, smart contracts are actually fairly
“dumb” as they ultimately rely on code that contains a set of instructions determining what happens when certain circumstances occur. In
this sense, even though they self-execute—thus not requiring any human intervention or any other form of intelligence—they remain
“computable contracts”42 which rely on being provided with data relevant to compliance or performance.
From a programming point of view, smart contracts are generally
based on blockchains, a technology “that permanently records transactions in a way that cannot be later erased but can only be sequentially
updated, in essence keeping a never-ending historical trail.”43 Originally
created to support crypto-currencies such as Bitcoin,44 the distributed
ledger technology behind blockchains is now being used in other fields,

42.

Harry Surden, Computable Contracts, 46 UC Davis L. Rev. 629, 636 (2012)
(“When a contract term is “computable,” the parties have arranged for a
computer to make automated, prima-facie assessments about compliance or
performance (i.e., as in the comparison of payment terms to payment
data).”).

43.

William Mougayar, The Business Blockchain: Promise, Practice,
and Application of the Next Internet Technology xxi (2016).

44.

See Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System,
BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/9K8Z-P557]
(last visited Mar. 29, 2018).
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such as the management of land registries,45 securities transactions,46
and even trademark registration.47
For lawyers, smart contracts are a cause for concern for several
reasons. First, it remains unclear whether a traditional lawyer can competently “draft” or program a smart contract, even with the assistance
of an IT expert. Second, and this brings us back to AI: what happens
if a smart contract infused with learning capacities accesses contaminated pools of data? This could cause the smart contract to be executed
in ways incompatible with the parties’ intent, bringing into question
whether a smart contract can even be considered a contract.
This and other questions and examples make clear that the key AI
issue is not merely whether a given AI-enabled device is safe, but rather
how the aforementioned technologies will impact one another.
Discussions of AI tend to focus on the hardware, as if we are dealing
with self-aware, reasoning artificial beings. However, as should now be
evident, one cannot speak of AI without taking into account all of the
other associated technologies and the ways in which they all interact.
It is actually a technological ecosystem. As this Article will now address, for legal purposes, this complicates life extensively.

II. What Are the Legal Risks Stemming from These
“New” Technologies?
As discussed in Part I, AI is based on algorithms. These algorithms
can be written by humans, or with sufficient AI ability, a computer
system can create its own algorithms in order to accomplish goals set
by the master algorithms.48 Since a computer will always follow its
algorithm-supplied goals, we must be careful to anticipate ways in
which a computer might so comply. For example, IF a computer
45.

This is notably the case in Sweden. See Gertrude Chavez-Dreyfuss, Sweden
Tests Blockchain Technology for Land Registry, Reuters (June 16, 2016),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sweden-blockchain/sweden-tests-block
chain-technology-for-land-registry-idUSKCN0Z22KV [https://perma.cc/M8S
Y-ZXJJ].

46.

Michael Mainelli & Alistair Milne, The Impact and Potential of Blockchain
on the Securities Transaction Lifecycle (May 9, 2016) (SWIFT Inst.,
Working Paper No. 2015-007), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2777404 [https:
//perma.cc/EM7E-PZ2X].

47.

This type of service is one currently being offered by companies such as
Cognate. See generally Secure Your Company’s Most Valuable Assets—Its
Trademarks, Cognate, https://cognate.com/ [https://perma.cc/7R25GZ2H] (last visited Feb. 9, 2018).

48.

Cade Metz, Building A.I. That Can Build A.I., N.Y. Times (Nov. 5, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/05/technology/machine-learning-artificia
l-intelligence-ai.html [https://perma.cc/2C9Z-2TD8].
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charged with keeping a sidewalk clean had the capacity to do so, absent
programming protections, it might well determine that human beings
cause trash and that to keep the sidewalk clean, it should remove all
people from the sidewalk.49
Arguably, the most important near-term legal question associated
with AI is who or what should be liable for tortious, criminal, and contractual misconduct involving AI and under what conditions. This is
why it becomes essential to establish the risks stemming from an
overreliance on AI and identifying who can and should be held responsible for adopting the counter-measures aimed at mitigating these risks.
A. A Survey of Legal Risks Stemming from an Overreliance on
Algorithms

AI is already a part of many people’s lives. But, to fully understand
what we usually mean when we refer to AI, we have to start with the
business world, which is rapidly adopting AI-enabled technologies to
enhance productivity and profit. Perhaps the most useful examples are
those that at first blush might appear to be highly limited, a far cry
from avenging computer intelligences. In his book, Building the Internet
of Things,50 Maciej Kranz relates two examples from the mining industry, which we now paraphrase:
•
49.

Rio Tinto, a global, open-pit mining concern “has the
largest fleet of giant autonomous trucks in the world”

For a much more frightening real-world example, see Hallevy, supra note
3, at xv, 38 (2013) (relating that in 1981 a Japanese motorcycle employee
was killed by a robot working next to him after the robot’s algorithm
determined that the employee was “a threat to its mission,” and that pushing
the employee into an adjacent machine would remove the problem, which it
did, killing the employee.). Science fiction fans will be familiar with Isaac
Asimov’s Three Laws of Robotics which were intended to prevent such a
result:
A robot may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a
human being to come to harm.
A robot must obey orders given it by human beings except where
such orders would conflict with the First Law.
A robot must protect its own existence as long as such protection
does not conflict with the First or Second Law.
See, e.g., Isaac Asimov’s “Three Laws of Robotics”, Auburn University,
https://www.auburn.edu/~vestmon/robotics.html [https://perma.cc/222H6ZUQ] (last visited Feb. 9, 2018). As many have noted, the three laws will
not actually avoid the type of behavior that killed the Japanese employee.
See, e.g., Hallevy, supra note 3, at 15–17 (2013) (asking what would a
police robot do when a perpetrator is threatening to kill a hostage and the
robot must kill the perpetrator to save the hostage?).

50.

Kranz, supra note 34, at 13, 15.
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transporting “more than 200 million tons of materials
across approximately 3.9 million kilometers.” Extreme
conditions and extreme loads create major and expensive
maintenance problems. Installation of sensors in the
trucks connected via the Internet to computers able to
evaluate the truck data permits preventive maintenance
which forestalls breakdown, recovery, and repair.51
•

Goldcorp operates an underground “connected” gold
mine in Canada worked by more than 1,000 people.
Implementation of multi-faceted technology allowed the
company to “achieve real-time visibility, monitoring, and
ventilation control” over a single wireless network that
uses radio frequency identification (RFID) to provide live
tracking of people and equipment. As a result, the
company saves between $1.5 and 2.5 million dollars in
energy costs for ventilation; in the event of emergency
can locate people 45 to 50 minutes faster than before; and
can locate and track its equipment.52

These types of operations combine sensors, connected equipment,
and the data they supply to produce more efficient and profitable business. By incorporating machine learning algorithms, the system could,
for example, redeploy miners to more productive areas of the mine. Of
course, if, as we saw in Part I, the algorithm has been badly designed
and poorly trained—i.e. the coder, for instance, did not test sufficiently
rigorously the algorithm or the trainer incorporated a bias into the
system—or has access to polluted pools of data, the safety of these
miners could be put into jeopardy.
Similarly, a judge preparing to sentence an offender might consult
an AI-enabled digital report and recommendation that will predict the
probability of recidivism.53
Another example is that of now-anticipated autonomous vehicles.
If we assume fully autonomous, self-driving cars, we might have the
following: The user or passenger enters the car and speaks the destination. The car’s internal computer communicates with multiple computers located elsewhere to determine the most efficient, safest and
perhaps economical route. While en route, both the car’s own sensors
and those in other cars, on, above, below, and near the street monitor
progress, automobile condition, and compliance with operational and
traffic requirements. Mechanical and electronic functions—and if privately owned, perhaps the status of the owner’s required payments—
51.

Id. at 47–49.

52.

Id. at 49.

53.

See supra note 27.
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are all monitored with instant corrections. Police no longer need or,
perhaps even legally, can stop the vehicle. Instead, they have full data
access from the vehicle which, of course, is not being “driven” by a human being.54 In the event of a traffic violation, who is responsible? Logic
would dictate that it is those responsible for the technology oversight,
but who exactly? The car’s manufacturer? The AI programmer? The
trainer? This would obviously depend on the source of the oversight—
hardware, software, data, data sources, instruction transmission, etc.
These and other examples serve to show the complexity of: 1)
establishing how liability should apply to AI; and 2) who should ultimately be held responsible if an AI-enabled device fails to function in
the manner it was supposed to.
B. How to Address the Liability Issues Linked to Algorithms—Initially A
Status Question

There are essentially three ways to address legislatively the liability
issues linked to AI. First, AI-enabled devices can be treated as property
and therefore be the responsibility of their users, owners, or
manufacturers.55 Second, they could be treated as “semi-autonomous
beings,” and fall under a legal regime similar to that of children56 or
persons with mental disabilities, or even one similar to the notion of

54.

If one assumes full use of the Internet-of-Things for police to monitor data
transmission to and from the autonomous car, see, for example, John S.
Hollywood et. al., Using Future Internet Technologies to
Strengthen Criminal Justice 4 (2015), https://www.rand.org/pubs/
research_reports/RR928.html [https://perma.cc/85KK-34TX] (providing
that police justifications for ordinary traffic stops should vanish as there will
be no need to stop the car to investigate when vehicle operation data is
already and immediately available to the police and the responsible person,
organization, or computer(s) will not be a “driver”).

55.

See, e.g., F. Patrick Hubbard, Allocating the Risk of Physical Injury from
“Sophisticated Robots”: Efficiency, Fairness, and Innovation, in Calo et
al., supra note 4, at 25, 39.

56.

In the United States, tort law in this area will vary by state. The general
rule is that courts will ordinarily determine the reasonableness of children’s
negligence by comparison against a reasonable child of the same age,
assuming the child is not engaged in an adult activity such as flying a plane.
Some states, however, exempt children below a given age from tort liability
or establish rebuttable presumptions about liability exposure. See, e.g., 1A
Stuart M. Speiser et. al., The American Law of Torts § 5:16 (2013).
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agency.57 Third, like corporations, they could be treated as fully autonomous beings.58
From a legislative standpoint, the first model is relatively simple to
imagine and implement. It would also be the least strenuous to implement as it would require very little by way of legislative amendments.
In fact, foreign laws are already drafted in a way that allows for this
scenario. For example, in Quebec, as in most civil law jurisdictions, the
Civil Code states that “[t]he custodian of an inanimate object is bound
to make reparation for injury resulting from the autonomous act of said
object, unless he proves that he is not at fault.”59 This would be akin
to the common law doctrine of res ipsa loquitur under which negligence
is presumed if one’s property causes harm to a third party.60 In cases
where no negligence on the part of the custodian, owner, or user is
established, liability could be transferred to the manufacturer of the AIenabled device.61 This does bring up an interesting question of how to
apportion liability among the manufacturer, programmer and trainer of
the AI.62

57.

David C. Vladeck, Machines Without Principals: Liability Rules and
Artificial Intelligence, 89 Wash. L. Rev. 117, 122 (2014) (“[T]he key
conceptual question that autonomous thinking machines will pose is whether
it is fair to think of them as agents of some other individual or entity, or
whether the legal system will need to decide liability issues on a basis other
than agency.”).

58.

Hubbard, supra note 33, at 407 (2011). Note that machines with
“personhood” successfully sued in tort could pay damages from their earnings
or via a universal insurance pool likely funded from a percentage of the initial
cost of the machine. See infra note 64.

59.

Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c 64, art 1465 (Can.) (emphasis added).

60.

Byrne v. Boadle, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Exch. 1863). Put differently, this would
establish an evidentiary presumption shifting the burdens of production and
proof to the custodian seeking to avoid liability.

61.

Vladeck, supra note 57, at 141–42.

62.

See, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 316.86 (2016) (exempting automobile manufacturers
from liability when third-party AI is installed: “The original manufacturer
of a vehicle converted by a third party into an autonomous vehicle is not
liable in, and shall have a defense to and be dismissed from, any legal action
brought against the original manufacturer by any person injured due to an
alleged vehicle defect caused by the conversion of the vehicle, or by
equipment installed by the converter, unless the alleged defect was present
in the vehicle as originally manufactured.”); see also Weaver, supra note
4, at 56.

764

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 3·2018
The Trials and Tribulations of AI

The third model—granting legal personhood to AI—is also relatively simple to legislate. It would necessitate AI-insurance63 or the
creation of a regime of compulsory compensation64, but these are
schemes that legislators have dealt with before and do not pose unique
challenges as such. This model does, however, raise the more philosophical question of whether we consider autonomous vehicles, bots
and other AI-enabled technology to be truly “beings” deserving of
independent legal status. In the wake of IBM’s Watson’s win against
its human Jeopardy opponents,65 or Google’s AlphaGo beating the

63.

An insurance model for AI-enabled devices, dubbed the Turing registry, was
notably proposed in Curtis E.A. Karnow, Liability for Distributed Artificial
Intelligences, 11 Berkeley Tech. L. J. 147, 193–94 (1996):
[D]evelopers seeking coverage for an agent could submit it to a
certification procedure, and if successful would be quoted a rate
depending on the probable risks posed by the agent. That risk would
be assessed along a spectrum of automation: the higher the
intelligence, the higher the risk, and thus the higher the premium
and vice versa. If third parties declined to deal with uncertified
programs, the system would become self-fulfilling and self-policing.
Sites should be sufficiently concerned to wish to deal only with
certified agents. Programmers (or others with an interest in using,
licensing or selling the agent) would in effect be required to secure a
Turing certification, pay the premium and thereby secure protection
for sites at which their agents are employed.
Id. Although this form of remedy might seem unconscionable to some, there
is legal precedent in the United States. Such a system was put forth back in
the days of slavery to account for the autonomous acts of slaves—concededly
a discomforting comparison. See Jenny Bourne Wahl, Legal Constraints on
Slave Masters: The Problem of Social Cost, 41 Am. J. Legal Hist. 1, 20
(1997) (“In some states, owners bore no liability for willful, malicious,
intentional acts of slaves, just as masters did not pay for such acts committed
by servants. The costs of these acts were thus spread widely over the
slaveholding community.”).

64.

This could be modelled, for instance, on the International Oil Pollution
Compensation Funds, created under the auspices of the International
Maritime Organization pursuant to the 1992 International Convention on
Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage and the 1992 International
Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage. See International Oil
Compensation Funds, IOPC Funds, https://www.iopcfunds.org/ [https://
perma.cc/K4Z9-6KGH] (last visited Apr. 4, 2018). We are grateful to
Michael Z. Snider, a current second-year William & Mary law student for
this suggestion.

65.

See Jason Hanna, Computer Finishes Off Human Opponents on ‘Jeopardy!’,
CNN (February 17, 2011, 5:50 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/TECH/
innovation/02/16/jeopardy.watson/index.html [https://perma.cc/6TZJ4ZX3].
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world Go champion,66 one could posit that computers can now be programmed to be as intelligent as humans—a related but clearly different
classification. However, this implies both that intelligence is no more
than the capacity to conduct probabilistic analysis and that intelligence is perceived as the main criteria to establish legal capacity.
“Intelligence” is not enough for personhood, at least in most jurisdictions. Rather, the test for capacity is that of reason; a person has to
be endowed with reason to be held civilly or criminally liable, to enter
into a contract, or to exercise other forms of legal autonomy.67
As Erich Fromm put it:
Reason is man’s faculty for grasping the world by thought, in
contradiction to intelligence, which is man’s ability to manipulate
the world with the help of thought. Reason is man’s instrument
for arriving at the truth, intelligence is man’s instrument for
manipulating the world more successfully; the former is
essentially human, the latter belongs to the animal part of man.68

Whether or not one agrees with Fromm’s postulate, it remains undeniable that reason and intelligence are intrinsically linked and that
true “intelligence,” for lack of a better word, is more than computing
capacities, no matter how sophisticated. A case in point: individuals
suffering from savant syndrome. Brought to public consciousness
through Dustin Hoffman’s character in the 1988 film “Rain Man,”
savant syndrome “is a rare, but extraordinary, condition in which
persons with serious mental disabilities, including autistic disorder,
have some ‘island of genius’ which stands in marked, incongruous contrast to overall handicap.”69 Individuals afflicted with this condition will
often display impressive calculating abilities,70 yet can still be considered legally incompetent.
66.

See, e.g., Paul Mozur, Google’s AlphaGo Defeats Chinese Go Master in Win
for AI, N.Y. Times (May 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/
23/business/google-deepmind-alphago-go-champion-defeat.html [http://
perma.cc/A6R5-94V4].

67.

Arguably, this is inadequate as human beings are inherently sentient and
self-aware as well. The issue of who or what is “human” is an old one, gaining
importance in the field of “animal rights” as well. For a highly unusual
variation, see Emily Barton, The Book of Esther 129–34 (2016), in
which the protagonists debate whether artificial beings, “golems,” must be
both human and Jewish as they insist on Jewish prayer and performing
traditional and sacred Jewish activities.

68.

Erich Fromm, The Sane Society 65 (1955).

69.

Darold A. Treffert, The Savant Syndrome: An Extraordinary Condition.,
2009 Phil. Transactions of the Royal Soc’y 1351, 1351.

70.

Id.
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So how does this relate to AI? Like individuals suffering from savant
syndrome, AI-enabled devices have great computing capacities, but lack
in overall reason. This was brought to light, for example, by Tay’s racist
Twitter rants.71 The chatbot was intelligent enough to generate coherent tweets, but lacked the reason to understand the insensitive nature,
to put it lightly, of its postings. As Mireille Hildebrandt put it:
It seems to me that artificial intelligence in itself does not qualify
as [reasonable], even if some kind of consciousness would emerge.
Animals have consciousness but we do not consider them fit to
be subjected to legal punishment, because we have no indication
that they can reflect on their actions as their own actions. Their
consciousness is an awareness of the environment, without the
concomitant awareness of this awareness which is typical of the
human sense of self. Helmuth Plessner actually took this to be
the crucial difference between humans and non-human life forms:
the self-consciousness of the human person creates a distance
between the self, the world and the self itself, condemning humans
to what he called indirect directness, natural artificiality and a
utopian position. To be sensitive to censure, rather than mere
discipline, a subject needs to be conscious of its self, allowing the
kind of reflection that can lead to contestation or repentance in
the case of a criminal charge.72

The animal comparison is interesting as it seems to be a position
shared by both legal scholars and AI experts. For example, Yoshua
Bengio, one of the foremost international experts on machine learning,
has stated on more than one occasion that the intelligence of most AIenabled devices is comparable to that of a frog.73 As frogs do not have
legal personhood, logic would dictate that AI-enabled devices, for the
very reasons described in the quote above, should not either. This would
imply that if we reject placing AI within the inanimate property

71.

Sophie Kleeman, Here Are the Microsoft Twitter Bot’s Craziest Racist
Rants, Gizmodo (March 24, 2016, 11:43 AM), https://gizmodo.com/hereare-the-microsoft-twitter-bot-s-craziest-racist-ra-1766820160 [https://perma.
cc/HS97-JNDD].

72.

Mireille Hildebrandt, Ambient Intelligence, Criminal
Democracy, 2 Crim. L. & Phil. 163, 178 (2007).

73.

See Lucie Luneau, Retour Sur l’Intelligence Artificielle en 10 ans et 10
points, ACS (May 15, 2004), http://www.acs.qc.ca/actualite/192-retour-surlintelligence-artificielle-en-10-ans-et-10-points.html [https://perma.cc/6F3Q
-D7XF]. The author states [translation]: “The current learning ability of a
computer is about that of a frog. ‘To worry that a computer surpasses us
would be as if ancient Egyptians worried about the pollution that will be
created by the traffic of spaceships on Mars.’”
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category, classic tort law applicable to animals74 would best suit current
advances in AI. Therefore, in the absence of known misconduct formerly
committed by an AI entity, only a clearly “dangerous” AI-enabled device would dictate liability, or rather, the level of care that its manufacturer, programmer, or owner should take in its development.
However, if we are to believe IT pioneers like Bill Gates, Elon Musk,
and Steve Wozniak,75 the AI-animal metaphor could be short-lived, as
AI is becoming increasingly powerful and could eventually reach a level
of ability or consciousness equal to that of humans. If this is the case,
does the position attributing legal personhood to AI become the only
solution? Some authors such as Lawrence B. Solum have held this
position for years.76 As Solum puts it, refusing legal personhood to AI
“is akin to American slave owners saying that slaves could not have
constitutional rights simply because they were not white or simply
because it was not in the interests of whites to give them rights.”77
Although we disagree with this premise, which in our view understates
the true effects of slavery on the African-American community to this
day,78 slavery laws—when stripped from their historical, societal, and
moral contexts—do offer interesting insight on how more advanced AI
could be approached from the standpoint of liability.
As explained in Wright v. Weatherly,79 in some states “a master was
liable for every [slave’s] trespass, whether the act be done when in the
master’s service, or not, and whether with or without the master’s
knowledge.”80 Putting aside the obvious ethical and legal repulsion to
74.

See generally Behrens v. Bertram Mills Circus, Ltd. [1957] 2 QB 1, 11 (Eng.).
The acts of wild animals give rise to strict liability. Others, especially
domestic animals impose tort liability only if harm is foreseeable.

75.

Pater Holley, Apple Co-Founder on Artificial Intelligence: ‘The Future Is
Scary and Very Bad for People’, Wash. Post (March 24, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/03/24/apple-co
-founder-on-artificial-intelligence-the-future-is-scary-and-very-bad-for-people/
?utm_term=.5b9ced4fdbff [http://perma.cc/Y6J8-47HV].

76.

See Solum, supra note 33, at 1261; see also Hubbard, supra note 33, at 434;
Susan W. Brenner, Humans and Humans+: Technological Enhancement and
Criminal Responsibility, 19 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 215, 244–48 (2013).

77.

Solum, supra note 33, at 1261.

78.

E.g., Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration
in the Age of Colorblindness 13 (2010).

79.

15 Tenn. (7 Yer.) 367, 378 (1835).

80.

Id. quoted in Jacob I. Corre, Thinking Property at Memphis: An Application
of Watson, 68 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1373, 1376 (1993); see also Anthony R.
Chase, Race, Culture, and Contract Law: From the Cottonfield to the
Courtroom, 28 Conn. L. Rev. 1, 29 (1995)(“[I]f the slave was acting as a
tradesman or carrier, the courts held the master liable for the slave’s trespass
or negligence since the master in such a situation invited the public to have
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one person owning another, this outcome makes sense from a purely
compensatory standpoint as slaves had no means to offer financial redress to their victims. The same logic could apply to AI as computers
have no property, while their owners, manufacturers and programmers
do.
C. Liability in the Near Future

In the immediate future, it seems clear that AI technology will be
regarded as property. It is unlikely that an AI device would be held
civilly or criminally liable for harm done by it. Rather, the primary
issue likely will be the classic one of civil liability under tort law. The
owner or operator will be liable for injury caused by its property whether “intelligent” or not. Product liability and negligence81 will be the
primary causes of action. Although the law may be clear in concept, it
may be very difficult to apply in practice given the IoT and impossibility of tracing the sources of data relied upon by an algorithm.
Imagine a dam failure caused by an AI control system reliant on
thousands of sensors supplied by multiple vendors, data supplied from
independent third parties, many of which are derived from other AI devices, with decision-making shared with other non-owned AI devices.
The Restatement (Third) of Torts—Product Liability § 5 declares:
One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing
product components who sells or distributes a component is
subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by a
product into which the component is integrated if:
the component is defective in itself, as defined in this Chapter,
and the defect causes the harm; or
(b)(1) the seller or distributor of the component substantially
participates in the integration of the component into the design
of the product; and
(2) the integration of the component causes the product to be
defective, as defined in this Chapter; and
(3) the defect in the product causes the harm.82
confidence in the slave’s ability . . . .”); Wahl, supra note 63, at 19
(“Entrusting one’s slave was a double-edged sword, however, because owners
were often responsible for injuries caused by their slaves, much as masters
can be liable for the actions of their servants.”).
81.

Negligence here obviously includes also medical and other forms of
professional malpractice.

82.

Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. § 5 (Am. Law. Inst.
1998). In Quebec, the law is simpler; a manufacturer is responsible for a
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In one sense, this will permit the classic tort suit: sue everyone.
Pragmatically, however, given a sufficiently large enough harm, IoT
distributed AI blame may be so large as to defy legal resolution.
Assuming an adequate duty of care, we may be unable to prove factual
fault or, if we can, proximate cause.83 Put differently, the harm caused
may have been unforeseeable from the perspective of a specific component manufacturer.
And, to be fair, we might add the contractual issue. Is a predictive
AI a “good” or a “service” under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, given the differences that classification can yield? When is a
smart contract a “contract,” an alternative to the classic contract,84 or
a device?
In short, the AI age starts with traditional legal concepts increasingly applied to new and previously unforeseen circumstances impelling
legal change. This has happened before, of course, but the AI age will
not only be immense in scope it will also proceed incredibly quickly.
Our legal systems tend to be reactive and not proactive, especially when
we cannot predict what the future will be like. One author writes that
in 1880 experts charged with predicting what New York City would
look like a hundred years later reported that it would be destroyed. The
manure that would be generated by the more than six million horses
needed by the city’s people would make it uninhabitable.85 The modern
internal combustion engine and the automobiles it produced was unpredictable. Predicting the evolution of AI and its related technologies may
be equally unsuccessful.
Of course, there is an inherent risk that, if we wait, contemporary
liability rules, which in the United States are designed to not only compensate injured victims but also to deter wrong doing, will stifle AI
“safety defect.” See Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c 64, art 1468 (Can.).
What does this mean in a distributed causation environment?
83.

Perhaps breathing new life into the landmark torts case Palsgraf v. Long
Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (1928).

84.

There is discussion in the literature of smart contracts being considered as
an alternative to legally enforceable contracts or as somewhat analogous to
the way in which letters of credit operate. See, e.g., Stephen McJohn & Ian
McJohn, The Commercial Law of Bitcoin and Blockchain Transactions 17
(Suffolk Univ. Law Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 1613, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2874463 [https://perma.cc/M9238ATU].

85.

Jeff Stibell, Breakpoint: Why the Web Will Implode, Search
Will Be Obsolete, and Everything Else You Need to Know About
Technology Is in Your Brain 23–24 (2013) (citing Steven D. Levitt
& Stephen J. Dubner, SuperFreakonomics: Global Cooling,
Patriotic Prostitutes, and Why Suicide Bombers Should Buy Life
Insurance 8–10 (2009)).
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innovation while we ponder how best to change them. If nothing else,
that poses our last matter: how can AI flourish while staying within the
confines of a society of rights?

III. How Can AI Flourish While Staying Within the
Confines of a Society of Rights?
In his 1999 article, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberspace Might
Teach Us,86 Lawrence Lessig asked a series of questions on how those
in the legal community should address the regulation of cyberspace. As
Lessig put it:
[L]aw faces a choice—whether to regulate to change this architectural
feature, or to leave cyberspace alone and disable this collective or
individual goal. Should the law change in response to these
differences? Or should the law try to change the features of
cyberspace, to make them conform to the law? And if the latter, then
what constraints should there be on the law’s effort to change
cyberspace’s “nature”? What principles should govern the law’s
mucking about with this space? Or, again, how should law regulate?87

To borrow a famous quote attributed to Spanish philosopher
George Santayana, “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”88 In this sense, we should study how the law of
cyberspace came to be, as Lessig’s interrogations remain extremely relevant when addressing AI.
As Lessig posited, technology—in his example, cyberspace; in our
case, AI—can be regulated in different manners. The classic route for
regulation, of course, remains legislation. However, the author continues
by suggesting that “Code” could also be the key to regulating technology. These are therefore the two avenues this Article will now broach
as they pertain to AI.
A. Changing Laws to Address AI Innovations

As legal professionals, our initial reaction when faced with technologies we do not quite understand is often to take the legislative route
and draft a legal framework destined to control the use and spread of
these technologies. AI has not escaped this trend as many states have
86.

Lawrence Lessig, Commentary: The Law of the Horse: What Cyberspace
Might Teach Us, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 501 (1999).

87.

Id. at 505.

88.

Matthew Caleb Flamm, George Santayana (1863—1952), Internet
Encyclopedia Phil., https://www.iep.utm.edu/santayan/ [https://
perma.cc/QJ9S-HNPT] (last visited Apr. 3, 2018).
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already adopted legislation aimed at curtailing the use of AI in certain
fields.89 In fact, some authors are even predicting the drafting of a
Uniform Artificial Intelligence Act by the end of the decade.90 Even famous businessman Elon Musk has implored legislators to act quickly in
regulating AI.91
Unfortunately, to borrow a few lines from Justice Easterbrook’s
famous “Law of the Horse” speech—the very speech that inspired
Lawrence Lessig to publish his aforementioned article on the same
topic—“Beliefs lawyers hold about computers, and predictions they
make about new technology, are highly likely to be false. This should
make us hesitate to prescribe legal adaptations for cyberspace. The
blind are not good trailblazers.”92 Although Justice Easterbrook’s general thesis can be, and was,93 disputed, history has proven him right
when it comes to trying to predict and legislate on technological
change.94 In fact, his statement can already be verified in one field of
AI, that of self-driving cars.
To this day, twenty-one states have adopted legislation regarding
self-driving cars, and more are expected to follow suit.95 Even the US
government is currently working on a bill to regulate the use of autonomous vehicles.96 As this technology is still in its infancy, the drafters
of these bills have taken to predict the future, and some of their predictions have already proven to be problematic. For example, in the
89.

This is the case, for example regarding driverless cars. See Statistics Can.,
supra note 6; see also To Provide for Information on Highly Automated
Driving Systems to be Made Available to Prospective Buyers, H.R. 3388,
115th Cong. (1st Sess. 2017).

90.

Weaver, supra note 4, at 61.

91.

Ali Breland, Elon Musk: We Need to Regulate AI Before ‘It’s Too Late’,
Hill (July 17, 2017), http://thehill.com/policy/technology/342345-elonmusk-we-need-to-regulate-ai-before-its-too-late [https://perma.cc/U85X9ENP].

92.

Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U.
Chi. Legal F. 207, 207 (1996).

93.

See generally Lessig, supra note 86.

94.

For example, the Utah Digital Signatures Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 46-3101 to 46-3-504 (West 1995), which was adopted in 1995, was later repealed
by 2006 Utah Laws, c. 21 § 13 (West), notably because it required the use
of a specific technology that proved ill-chosen.

95.

See Autonomous Vehicles Self-Driving Vehicles Enacted Legislation, Nat’l
Conf. State Legislatures (Jan. 2, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/
transportation/autonomous-vehicles-self-driving-vehicles-enacted-legisla
tion.aspx [https://perma.cc/GP5W-ZSFR].

96.

See To Provide for Information on Highly Automated Driving Systems to
be Made Available to Prospective Buyers, H.R. 3388, 115th Cong. (1st Sess.
2017).
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District of Columbia, an autonomous vehicle must have “a driver seated
in the control seat of the vehicle while in operation who is prepared to
take control of the autonomous vehicle at any moment.”97 This obviously limits how self-driving cars could be used and designed. For
example, under these rules, GM’s recently announced autonomous cars
without steering wheels or pedals98 will never be able to drive on D.C.
roads. It also means that driverless taxi services99 will not be able to establish themselves in the Capitol. This might be exactly what the
drafters of the Automated Vehicle Act of 2012 had in mind, or it could
simply be that, six years ago, they could not fathom that strides in AI
would make it possible to have fully automated vehicles. Whichever the
case may be, this demonstrates that the technology is evolving in a
manner that is incompatible with what the drafters of these laws had
in mind.
Of course, getting back to Justice Easterbrook’s statement, this is
not to say that we shouldn’t legislate on AI, smart contracts, or the
Internet of Things, or wait until we have understood all there is to
know about these technologies—something that could take centuries100—before adopting further AI-related legislation. History does
teach us, however, that we should be careful in drafting said laws.101 To
quote iconic French jurist Jean Carbonnier, “one should always tremble
when legislating.”102 However, how should the current legal framework
be adapted—through the modification of current laws, or the adoption
of new legislation—to take into account AI innovations?

97.

D.C. Code § 50-2352(2) (2013); see also Weaver, supra note 4, at 56.

98.

Alex Davies, GM Will Launch Robocars Without Steering Wheels Next
Year, WIRED (Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/gm-cruiseself-driving-car-launch-2019/ [https://perma.cc/PRK8-9GDF].

99.

Timothy J. Seppala, Waymo’s Driverless Taxi Service Will Open to the
Public Soon, engaget (July 11, 2017), https://www.engadget.com/2017/
11/07/waymo-autnomous-taxi-phoenix/ [https://perma.cc/FC99-2MFE].

100. In Walter J. Ong, Orality and Literacy (30th Anniversary ed. 2012),
the author explains that it was only with the advent of the Internet that we
came to fully understand how paper, as a technology, had truly impacted
our lives. In fact, the author argues that technology can only truly be
understood in hindsight, i.e. when it has been replaced by another. Id. at 2–
3.
101. On this issue, see Roger Brownsword, So What Does the World Need Now?
Reflections on Regulating Technologies, in, Regulating Technologies—
Legal Futures, Regulatory Frames And Technological Fixes 23
(Roger Brownsword & Karen Yeung eds., 2008).
102. The original quote reads: “Ne légiférez qu’en tremblant.” Olivier Abel,
Paul Ricoeur, Jacques Ellul, Jean Carbonnier, Pierre Chaunu:
Dialogues 75 (2012).
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In order to answer this specific question, we suggest, as noted
above, to study recent history and how the law of the Internet has
evolved. For all of the discussions about “Internet sovereignty”103 and
how “cyberspace law is different,” very few laws were ultimately
adopted to strictly address Internet-related issues, The Digital
Millennium Copyright Act,104 and Communications Decency Act105 being the main exceptions to this rule. In most other Internet-related
issues, current legislation and common law rules were tweaked or simply
applied as is. Keeping this in mind, one could argue that the same
should be true for AI.
For example, in a recent New-York Times Op-Ed, Oren Etzioni
proposed three rules that he believes should apply to A.I:
•

an AI system must be subject to the full gamut of laws
that apply to its human operator;

•

an AI system must clearly disclose that it is not human;
and

•

an AI system cannot retain or disclose confidential
information without explicit approval from the source of
that information.106

These rules, which are more of a tip of the hat to Isaac Asimov’s
aforementioned three laws of robotics than directives aimed at state
legislators, do somewhat support the argument that current laws should
apply to AI.107 The problem is, which ones, and how should they be
adapted?

103. John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace,
Electronic Frontier Found. (1996), https://www.eff.org/cyberspaceindependence [https://perma.cc/37QR-HV9S].
104. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012).
105. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).
106. Oren Etzioni, How to Regulate Artificial Intelligence, N.Y. Times
(September 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/01/opinion/
artificial-intelligence-regulations-rules.html [https://perma.cc/C247-KMEW].
107. This follows the general rule that “[w]hen AI agents act autonomously, we
expect them to behave according to the formal and informal norms to which
we hold our fellow humans. As fundamental social ordering forces, law and
ethics therefore both inform and adjudge the behavior of AI systems. The
dominant research needs involve both understanding the ethical, legal, and
social implications of AI, as well as developing methods for AI design that
align with ethical, legal, and social principles.” Nat’l Sci. & Tech.
Council, The National Artificial Intelligence Research and
Development Strategic Plan 26 (2016), https://obamawhite
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According to the National Science and Technology Council, the
answer to this question lies in classic risk analysis:108
[T[he approach to regulation of AI-enabled products to protect
public safety should be informed by assessment of the aspects of
risk that the addition of AI may reduce, alongside the aspects of
risk that it may increase. If a risk falls within the bounds of an
existing regulatory regime, moreover, the policy discussion should
start by considering whether the existing regulations already
adequately address the risk, or whether they need to be adapted
to the addition of AI.109

Although risk analysis is a process that has been used by lawmakers
for years, it remains more prevalent in other fields. For example, risk
analysis is at the very core of cybersecurity, i.e. the degree to which information technology is safe from unwanted external interference. Over
the years, numerous conceptual frameworks were developed to structure
risk analysis as it relates to cybersecurity.110 Although all have valid
tenets, we are partial to Bruce Schneier’s simplified five-step process:
1) What assets are you trying to protect?
2) What are the risks to these assets?
3) How well does the security solution mitigate those risks?
4) What other risks does the security solution cause?
5) What costs and trade-offs does the security solution impose?111

To answer these questions, one must first understand the concept
of risk. Risk is usually defined as the probability that a threat can exploit a vulnerability in the system before the proper safeguards are put

house.archives.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse_files/microsites/ostp/NS
TC/national_ai_rd_strategic_plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/M43S-XP2S].
108. On the general topic of risk analysis, see David Vose, Risk Analysis (3rd
ed., 2008).
109. Nat’l Sci. and Tech. Council, Preparing for the Future of
Artificial Intelligence (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/
sites/default/files/whitehouse_files/microsites/ostp/NSTC/preparing_for_
the_future_of_ai.pdf [https://perma.cc/56T2-FP33].
110. On this topic, see Nicolas Vermeys, Responsabilité Civile et Sécurité
Informationnelle (2010).
111. Bruce Schneier, Beyond Risk: Thinking Sensibly About Security
in an Uncertain World 14–15 (2003).
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into place.112 Threats obviously include events such as surreptitious external “hacking” from a network or the Internet, but they also include
such intrusions as an employee sitting down at a friend’s computer over
the lunch hour and making improper use of it.
Because AI-enabled devices frequently use data from the Internet
or implement their algorithms via the Internet, AI functions are especially vulnerable to cybersecurity threats. In July 2017, for example,
Forbes reported that “Criminals Hacked a Fish Tank to Steal Data
from a Casino.”113 The fish tank was connected to the Internet to permit
remote monitoring of water conditions, and the thieves used that connection as the route into the casino’s computers.114
Getting back to applying risk analysis to AI from a legislative
standpoint, if we adapt Schneier’s five-step process to legislative analysis regarding AI, the process could be imagined as follows:
1) What rights are you trying to protect?
2) What are the risks that AI poses to these rights?
3) How well does current legislation mitigate those risks?
4) What risks would the application of current legislation to AI
cause?
5) What costs and trade-offs does current legislation impose?

Looking at these steps, the main issue remains that of identifying
the risks associated with the use of AI under step 2. Only then will we
be able to establish whether current legislation can sufficiently mitigate
those risks under step 3.115 As for steps 4 and 5, they are mostly linked
to the risk of current legislation stifling innovation. Getting back to the
Internet parallel, the “notice and takedown” doctrine116 was created for
112. Ira Winkler, Zen and the Art of Information Security 26–27
(2007).
113. Lee Mathews, Criminals Hacked a Fish Tank to Steal Data from a Casino,
Forbes (July 27, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/leemathews/2017/
07/27/criminals-hacked-a-fish-tank-to-steal-data-from-a-casino/#1547e65c3
2b9 [https://perma.cc/PDF7-4XQQ].
114. Id.
115. One could argue that insofar as code must periodically be updated to protect
against accidental and intentional risk—and that most computer users fail
to update their systems, we should deter this negligent behavior by
legislating liability at least for those whose failure to install security upgrades
harms others or their property.
116. See Org. for Econ. Cooperation and Dev., The Role of Internet
Intermediaries in Advancing Public Policy Objectives 144 (2011)
(“Legal frameworks such as the European Union E-Commerce Directive
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that very reason. It was meant to ease liability constraints that existing
legislation put on Internet service providers.
This model is voluntarily imperfect as it starts from the postulate
that legislation is the only way to curtail the risks caused by AI.
However, there are other, sometimes more successful, ways to arrive at
this same end through the use of code.
B. Coding Legal Constructs and Barriers into Algorithms

As Lawrence Lessig put it:
In real space, we recognize how laws regulate—through
constitutions, statutes, and other legal codes. In cyberspace we
must understand how a different “code” regulates—how the
software and hardware (i.e., the “code” of cyberspace) that make
cyberspace what it is also regulate cyberspace as it is. As William
Mitchell puts it, this code is cyberspace’s “law.” “Lex
Informatica,” as Joel Reidenberg first put it, or better, “code is
law.”117

This statement, which was made regarding cyberspace, holds as true
with respect to AI-enabled devices. Computers exist to perform given
functions. These functions are programmed in by their programmers—
who serve somewhat as legislators as they can force a device to act in
a certain manner or forbid it from doing so. Isaac Asimov’s aforementioned three laws of robotics serve this point. The reason, according
to Asimov’s fictional universe, a robot:
•

May not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow
a human being to come to harm;

•

Must obey orders given it by human beings except where
such orders would conflict with the First Law; and

•

Must protect its own existence as long as such protection
does not conflict with the First or Second Law,

is because its programming does not allow it to go against these “laws.”
In this sense, code could be used to ensure compliance with current
legislation. For example, autonomous vehicles can be programmed to
obey the speed limit, making speeding violations a thing of the past. Of
course, as we discussed earlier in this article, there exists an issue of
(ECD) or the US Digital Millennium Copyright Act DMCA create a safe
harbor from liability for copyright infringement for various Internet actors
when they meet certain conditions. One of the common elements of these
regimes is that intermediaries must respond when they receive notice of an
alleged infringement from the rights holder or his or her representative, by
expeditiously removing the alleged infringing content.”).
117. Lawrence Lessig, Code: Version 2.0, 5 (2006).
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liability when there is a flaw in the code. But, what if the code is not
flawed, yet the AI stops obeying the “laws” it was pre-programmed to
obey? What if AI acted in a way that is inexplicable by reference to the
code and is, in fact, incompatible with it? After all, anyone who has
read an Isaac Asimov novel or seen a movie based on his books knows
that robots will ultimately break the three aforementioned laws if only
by being confronted by unforeseen circumstances. This is where Lessig’s
teachings stop being useful when discussing code as a means of controlling AI; it is also the major issue we are confronted with not only
from a legal standpoint, but from a societal one as well.
As eluded to in the first section of this Article, AI-enabled devices
are dependent on data. The more data they have access to and are
trained with, the better they can predict an outcome or address a given
situation. In this sense, “data analytics,” which can be envisioned as
the sophisticated and complex analysis by computer of enormous
amounts of data, called “big data,” is really at the heart of the current
boom in AI. Given appropriate data, a computer’s algorithms will
produce a given result. Inadequate and flawed data will produce erroneous results.118 A good example of this is Amazon’s ability to suggest
books a customer might like—if you do not train the algorithm
properly, for example if you buy a book for a niece or nephew without
indicating to the platform to disregard said purchase when making its
suggestions, it will most probably offer poor recommendations going
forward.
Data comes in many forms. Like a human being, a classic movie
robot listens, sees, and often “feels.” The robot takes in the raw observational data and then pursuant to its algorithms interprets the data and
decides what, if anything, to do as a result. A computer that places
stock trades without human intervention is doing the very same thing
but using different data obtained in a different form.
This is where an issue could arise. In the case of advanced machine
learning, i.e. deep learning, devices will eventually outgrow their initial
coding and use new sets of data to produce an outcome. This implies
that the calculation that led to said outcome is unknown to the consumer of the generated answer—which is often the case as the algorithm is
protected by trade secrets119—or worse, unknown to the programmers
118. For example, incomplete or erroneous data could cause bias within the AI
algorithm. See Nat’l Sci. and Tech. Council, supra note 109, at 30 (“In
the criminal justice system, some of the biggest concerns with Big Data are
the lack of data and the lack of quality data. AI needs good data. If the data
is incomplete or biased, AI can exacerbate problems of bias. It is important
that anyone using AI in the criminal justice context is aware of the
limitations of current data.”).
119. As one author puts it: “algorithmic opacity is a largely intentional form of
self-protection by corporations intent on maintaining their trade secrets and
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because the AI-enabled device has acted upon data that they are
unaware of or, unbeknownst to them, it has created its own algorithms
to “solve problems.”120 In other words, “[a]s Machine Learning algorithms get smarter, they are also becoming more incomprehensible.”121
In this sense:
[T]he fact that Machine Learning algorithms can act in ways
unforeseen by their designer raises issues about the ‘autonomy,’
‘decision-making,’ and ‘responsibility’ capacities of AI. When
something goes wrong, as it inevitably does, it can be a daunting task
discovering the behavior that caused an event that is locked away
inside a black box where discoverability is virtually impossible.122

This opacity issue123 is the one that seems most daunting for lawmakers. Although legislation can always be passed to make a protected
line of coding available for analysis in case of an accident,124 how does
one identify how an algorithm produces an erroneous result when even
its programmers cannot explain how this result was attained?
This finding has led to political pressure “to have some form of
explanation for any AI-based determination.”125 But this does not simply imply the need to have transcripts, for example, of the case law a
robot lawyer has consulted to arrive to its decision, it further implies
the need to comprehend the whole technological ecosystem in which a
given AI-enabled device resides. This brings the analysis back to this
Article’s initial thesis: the main risk of the increasing reliance on AI,
and, therefore, the most difficult obstacle for regulators, does not reside
in the technology itself, but rather in the interaction between AIcompetitive advantage.” See Jenna Burrell, How the Machine ‘Thinks’:
Understanding Opacity in Machine Learning Algorithms, Big Data &
Society, Jan.–June 2016, at 1, 3.
120. Will Knight, The Dark Secret at the Heart of AI, MIT Tech. Rev. (Apr.
11, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/604087/the-dark-secret-atthe-heart-of-ai/ [https://perma.cc/29NZ-RH9J].
121. Colin Lewis and Dagmar Monett, AI & Machine Learning Black Boxes: The
Need for Transparency and Accountability, KDnuggets, https://www.
kdnuggets.com/2017/04/ai-machine-learning-black-boxes-transparency-accou
ntability.html [https://perma.cc/TR6G-GTV7] (last visited Feb. 4, 2018).
122. Id.
123. See Burrell, supra note 119, at 1.
124. It should be pointed out, however, that “A call for code ‘audits’ (where this
means reading the code) and the employment of ‘auditors’ may
underestimate what this would entail as far as the number of hours required
to untangle the logic of the code within a complicated software system.” See
id. at 4–5.
125. See Nat’l Sci. and Tech. Council, supra note 109, at 31.
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enabled devices—the sharing of information between databases erroneously believed to be in silos. If a computer hacker wants to corrupt
an AI-enabled device, the hacker can certainly erase data or tamper
with its coding, but a much more insidious means to the end is to add
invalid and unverified data to the device’s database and let it learn
itself into chaos.126

Conclusion
When one lives in such rapidly changing times, it is difficult to gain
sufficient perspective to grasp how myriad changes interface with each
other. Often it seems to be enough to just hold on to some form of secure support. The goal in sharing the preliminary views on how the
increasing use of AI, the IoT, smart contracts, and other technologies
discussed in this Article will affect the law is to emphasize that they
exist in a technological ecosystem. Although it is important to consider
the legal implications of each new technology on its own, our view is
that more attention should be given to the risks that are posed when
new technologies, especially those that are AI-enabled, are interconnected and interact with each other in ways that can at least seem
to be unfathomable.
Understanding AI and its related technologies can be difficult.
Consider, however, their impact on daily human life. Although many
are reasonably concerned about technological unemployment, consider
what smart contracts may do to legal practice. No doubt we will have
standard “boilerplate” to be tailored to a specific transaction, but what
of sophisticated custom work? What will lawyers need to know about
the technological ecosystem, and what skills will they, or perhaps their
AI assistants, associates, or partners, be able to do to produce, inspect,
and enforce a smart contract?
Our increasing reliance on AI, which certainly has its useful and
justifiable ends, is in no means a challenge for the legal system. This
Article has sketched, for example, some of the difficulties of establishing
tortious liability for AI-enabled unlawful acts. It has posited that the
legal system may respond in any number of ways, from relying on classic
tort law regimes of negligence and strict liability, to considering AI
126. Curtin E.A. Karnow makes a similar point: “Indeed, one way to “poison” a
robot is to interfere with its on-the-job training as it seeks to make patterns
from instances in the environment by substituting in misleading training
data—that is, faking the environment.” See Curtis E.A. Karnow, The
Application of Traditional Tort Theory to Embodied Machine Intelligence,
in Calo et al., supra note 4, at 51, 60. The Author notably refers to an
article by Alex Armstrong, Poison Attacks Against Machine Learning, I
Programmer (July 19, 2012), http://www.i-programmer.info/news/105artificial-intelligence/4526-poison-attacks-against-machine-learning.html
[https://perma.cc/R6FE-MBSE].
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devices “semi-autonomous beings,” to even granting them independent
legal personhood. None of these options are obvious. Each will require
the legal system and its practitioners to engage in understanding and
conceptualizing what AI is; how best the legal system can control it, if
at all, by way of rules, code, or both; and the extent to which our legal
system needs to adapt the growing complexity of the technological ecosystem.
Surely, members of the legal professions must engage with these
topics now lest we be entirely unprepared when faced with immediate
need for legal advice, legislation or rule-making, or case resolution.
There is an ancient Chinese saying, “May you live in interesting times.”
That we are doing so, we can say with certainty. We would do well,
however, to recognize that that saying is usually said to be a curse. Let
us work proactively to ensure that, legally at least, AI may prove a
blessing and not a curse.
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